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HOW TO BETTER GOVERN EMERGING MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS: DO CEO
CHARACTERISTICS MATTER?

ABSTRACT
There has been a wide array of research on corporate governance and its impact on firm
internationalization in the field of management. Scholars have looked at what governance
elements may become critical in different contexts while multinational corporations are
adopting to international markets. In general, emerging economies offer such a unique context
in terms of understanding how different macro-level factors may influence the performance of
these local businesses globally. In this paper, after providing a brief review on widely-used
theories in firm internationalization including motivators for such efforts, I examine the impact
of some CEO characteristics on the performance of emerging multinational corporations
(EMNCs). In particular, I argue that younger CEOs of EMNCs will help their companies better
perform in other foreign markets and this relationship is positively moderated by the CEO
international experience. I also argue that the CEO duality will (not) become helpful for these
EMNCs’ international performance if the host country is an emerging economy (a developed
economy). This theoretical work is grounded in upper echelons perspective and agency theory.

Keywords: Firm internationalization, Emerging multinational corporations (EMNCs), CEO age,
CEO duality, CEO international experience.
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INTRODUCTION
Firm internationalization has been widely researched in the field of international
business (IB) in order to understand critical antecedents for such efforts, motivators leading
companies towards this strategic path, and challenges that they may face including possible
consequences. Andersen (1997: 29) defines the very concept of internationalization as follows:
“Internationalization is the process of adapting exchange transaction modality to international
markets.” Sanders, Carpenter, and Gregersen (2001) enhance this definition by arguing that the
firm internationalization enables multinational corporations (MNCs) to explore unique business
ideas overseas and leverage resources without limitations of geographic distances.
An important context for the firm internationalization is emerging economies. According
to Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, and Wright (2000), emerging economies are defined as the “lowincome, rapid-growth countries using economic liberalization as their primary engine of
growth” (p. 249). They further argue that in order to identify a country as an emerging market,
there are two particular criteria that need to be met: “a rapid pace of economic development
and government policies favoring economic liberalization as well as the adoption of a freemarket system” (Hoskisson et al., 2000: 249). Because of their unique characteristics, these
markets provide a “rich-setting” for testing theories (Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Obloj, 2008). More
specifically, since emerging economies possess many unique resemblances among each other
and distinctions compared to developed markets, it can be argued that researching in this
context may provide some novel perspectives to those scholars who examine how these
similarities and differences are actually expected to affect firm performance.
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In this paper, after briefly discussing motivators for internationalization and related
theories that help to explain this very process, I look at the impact of CEO characteristics on the
EMNCs’ performance overseas. In particular, I examine how the CEO age, duality, and
international experience may or may not help to improve firm performance. According to the
upper echelons perspective, younger top executives have the ability to process critical
information better and faster and therefore, they can take bold actions in order to support the
growth of their companies instead of being committed to the status quo. In this context,
younger CEOs can be expected to better contribute to the success of their companies by also
relying on the information and experience that they have gained throughout their international
appointments. According to the agency theory, the CEO duality may prevent from potential
conflicts in decision-making at the top level since it gives the whole executive power to only
one individual, which might also result in less effective board monitoring. In this context,
depending on whether the economy is either emerging or developed, I argue that the CEO
duality may show different effects on either economy. In particular, the CEO duality can
become a useful corporate practice in terms of improving the performance of EMNCs in other
emerging markets; however, it is quite possible to observe an opposite effect in other
developed markets.

LITERATURE REVIEW: MOTIVATIONS FOR INTERNATIONALIZATION AND RELATED THEORIES
Emerging economy firms have to deal with challenging environmental conditions that
they may not be familiar with while entering other foreign markets. In order to be perform well
overseas, they have to adapt their existing strategies to specific conditions of those new
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markets where they enter (Aulakh, Rotate, & Teegen, 2000). Entering emerging economies is
particularly very unique because of these two aspects: “institutional development in different
emerging economies directly affects entry strategies, and investors’ needs for local resources
impact entry strategies in different ways in different institutional contexts” (Meyer, Estrin,
Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009: 62). Basically, different types of institutional structures and uniqueness
of local resources can be considered distinct characteristics of these markets. Therefore, it is
extremely important to examine and understand what actually motivates these cross-border
transactions over domestic ones.
In general, primary motivators for firm internationalization between emerging
economies and other foreign markets can be listed as market seeking, resource seeking, cost
reduction, and organizational learning and exploration. According to Athreye and Kapur (2009),
one of the most important reasons why emerging economy firms venture abroad is to “gain
access and proximity to overseas markets” (p. 214). For instance, emerging economies such as
India and China prefer investing aboard since they look for new markets via bringing in their
products and services (Athreye & Kapur, 2009). Beule and Duanmu (2012) also argue that
multinational firms usually look for relatively large markets in which they can bring their
“market-, natural resource- or strategic asset-seeking investments” (p. 266). Therefore, having
an access to new markets should be considered an important strategic path for EMNCs.
Resource seeking is the second important component for moving into another foreign
economy for EMNCs. According to Carmody (2009), China shows a great deal of interest on
African markets because of the availability of natural resources such as oil and mineral
resources. Beule and Duanmu (2012) also argue that increased demand to EMNCs’ products
5

and/ or services make these firms move to other markets in order to seek more resources.
Therefore, gaining an access to abundance of resources (raw material, labor, etc.) for both
improving operations and reducing economic deficiencies will become another critical
determinant of performing better for EMNCs (Shirokova & Covin, 2012).
Reducing the cost of goods is another important factor of internationalization for
EMNCs. In this context, Athreye and Kapur (2009) define “frugal engineering” by stating that for
some countries such as India and China, it is very important to manufacture its products at the
lowest possible cost. That’s why these countries tend to go to Africa to find cheap labor and
material (Hart & Padayachee, 2000) so that they can reduce the overall cost of their production.
As Baack and Boggs (2007) also argue, if EMNCs are able to reach efficiency in their production
via having a direct access to economic assets and labor force, they will be better able to
differentiate themselves from others towards becoming new “cost leaders” in the industry.
Organizational learning and exploration is the fourth critical component that EMNCs
look for while entering other foreign markets. As Chittoor (2009) argues, once emerging
economy firms decide to go international, one of their primary focuses is to explore resources
and capabilities that already exist in those new markets as well as to exploit them. In addition,
throughout internationalization, when an EMNC enters a new market, it can better expand its
operations via using its existing know-how as well as acquiring novel know-how (Chittoor, 2009;
Hitt, Tihanyi, Miller, & Connelly 2006). Thus, this very learning process overseas is expected to
significantly benefit EMNCs towards long-term survival.
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In the literature, there have been several theories and perspectives used to “explain
why multinational firms exist” and how they function (Oviatt & McDougall, 1997: 86) including
the transaction cost theory (TCT), agency theory (AT), eclectic theory (ET), resource-based
theory (RBT), institutional theory (IT), and linkage-leverage-learning (LLL) perspective. First,
according to Hoskisson et al. (2000: 254), the TCT focuses on “the firm-environment interface
through a contractual or exchange-based approach.” The underlying consideration of this
theory is how to minimize the cost while entering new markets (Andersen, 1997). Second,
Jensen and Meckling (1976: 308) define the agency relationship as “a contract under which one
or more persons engage another person to perform some service on their behalf which involves
delegating some decision-making authority to the agent.” According to the AT, there is going to
be some cost associated with decision-making processes done by the agent (Jensen & Meckling,
1976), which is required by the principal. Third, the ET explains internationalization activity of
multinational corporations (Athreye and Kapur, 2009) by considering its three main aspects,
namely the ownership, location, and internalization. As Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner
(1999) explain, the ownership dimension looks at control issues within firm’s transactions; the
location dimension looks at resource-related issues such as availability and cost; and the
internalization dimension looks at cost-related issues for transactions as well as firm’s
coordination efforts. Fourth, the RBT is defined as “a theory of strategy and of sustainable rent”
(Kogut & Zander, 1992: 509). They argue that choosing appropriate resources is a highly
complex issue for firms, especially when there are high barriers to the entry and an uncertainty
exists (Kogut & Zander, 1992). This theory becomes more critical in the context of foreign entry
since it helps the entering firm better “develop the capability of combining the requisite foreign
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and domestic resources” (Guillen, 2000: 368). North (1993: 12) defines institutions as “rules of
the game.” Fifth, the IT argues that “the role of institutions in an economy is to reduce both
transaction and information costs through reducing uncertainty and establishing a stable
structure that facilitates interactions” (Hoskisson et al., 2000: 252). And finally, the LLL
perspective suggests that “multinational latecomers engage in foreign direct investment to
achieve new competitive advantages via external linkage, leverage, and learning rather than
exploiting existing internal advantages via internal control” (Li, 2007: 299). As Athreye and
Kapur (2009) argue, the main idea of this perspective is that latecomers will have to utilize their
global connections in order to both learn some new ways for improving their competitive
advantage and leverage their current operational advantages so that they can minimize
prospective problems related to finding resources, reducing transaction costs, and enhancing
coordination efforts during their cross-border operations.

THEORY DEVELOPMENT: CEO CHARACTERISTICS AND EMNCs PERFORMANCE
Aguilera and Jackson (2003) define corporate governance as “the outcome of
interactions among multiple stakeholders” (p. 449). In the literature, it has been argued that
governance structure of the firm is expected to significantly affect firm performance via both
harmonizing conflicts of interest between agents and principals and improving the wealth of
shareholders (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). Bell, Filatotchev, and Aguilera (2014) also argue
that governance mechanisms may have important impacts on improving stock market valuation
of the firm and in turn gaining legitimacy. Although corporate governance practices might vary
significantly around the globe (Chizema & Shinozawa, 2012), enhancing value creation via
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utilizing the most effective practices is at the core of this phenomena (Carney, 2005). Three
main pillars of corporate governance include the board, top management, and shareholders of
the company. In this paper, the main focus will be on the CEO as the highest rank executive
officer within top management teams.
The CEO is considered “the central strategic decision-maker” (Barker & Mueller, 2002:
783) within the organization. These top-level executives possess very distinct decision-making
attributes, which are closely related to their cognitive and demographic characteristics (Beber
& Fabbri, 2012). According to the upper echelons perspective, executives’ characteristics can
significantly affect how they make decisions and in turn the firm performance (Hambrick and
Mason, 1984).These powerful actors can also influence the firm’s market value (Nelson, 2005).
In addition, they are fully responsible for the effective information exchange and integration
within the top management team (Buyl, Boone, Hendriks, and Matthyssens, 2011). Due to all
these vital tasks that affect the organizational performance directly, it is crucial to examine
critical linkages between CEO characteristics and EMNCs’ performance in foreign markets.
CEO Age
Some empirical research has found that younger executives are bigger advocates of
strategic change (Johnson, Schnatterly , & Hill, 2013). Especially, younger CEOs tend to strongly
support the change (Golden & Zajac, 2001) and new product introductions (Barker & Mueller,
2002) as a part of their firm’s growth efforts. As argued in the upper echelons theory, younger
executives are more willing to take risks toward novel practices whereas older executives may
prefer being risk-averse by embracing conservative approaches and being committed to the
status-quo (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). In addition, as the information-processing perspective
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argues, younger executives are expected to better process and integrate critical information so
that they will make their decisions with more confidence compared to those of older
executives. By combining these two main arguments, it can be stated that a younger CEO of an
EMNC can better handle challenges, complexities, and ambiguities overseas due to his or her
abilities in effective information-processing and good-quality decision-making. In other words,
we can expect younger CEOs of EMNCs to better absorb the “newness” in an international
setting by taking necessary actions immediately. Therefore, I argue that the CEO age is
negatively related to the international performance of EMNC.
Proposition 1a: The younger the CEO, the better the international performance of the EMNC.
CEO International Experience
Executives’ previous experiences influence their strategic choices and managerial
actions (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Executives with international experience can encourage
other upper echelons’ members to “consider internationalization a more viable avenue for
expansion” (Carpenter, Pollock, & Leary, 2003: 808), which is a very critical aspect of CEO’s
responsibilities within a firm trying to expand its operations globally. O’Reilly, Synder, and
Boothe (1993) further argue that the experience factor is important for “key” decision-makers
in organizations since they can better communicate their thoughts with their industry partners
as well. Therefore, an executive experience should be considered a concept that has direct
effects on both within-firm and within-industry relationships.
Through their international experience, top executives, in particular CEOs, can better
analyze the external environment via using a global “lens” (Guna & Jalland, 1996). Possessing
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knowledge about international business operations and cross-cultural management will make a
significant contribution to the CEO’s strategic decision-making efforts so that he or she can act
up on all possible opportunities confidently. Having a younger CEO with an international
experience becomes much more critical in the context of EMNCs since these CEOs are fully
responsible for observing, analyzing, and understanding “brand new” environmental conditions
before taking any sorts of strategic actions necessary. Therefore, I argue that the CEO
international experience positively moderates the negative relationship between the CEO age
and EMNC’s international performance.
Proposition 1b: The younger the CEO with an international experience, the much better the
international performance of the EMNC.
CEO Duality
In the management literature, there have been controversial views regarding effects of
the CEO duality on organizational performance. According to Joseph, Ocasio, and McDonnell
(2014), if both the CEO and chairperson are same persons, this duality perspective will provide
the CEO with a broader authority over the board, which reduces the possibility of power
conflicts at the top executive level and leads to reaching consensus within the top management
team much faster. On the opposite side, the CEO non-duality can increase the effectiveness of
board monitoring and provide the top management team with better strategic counseling and
advice so that interests of shareholders can be better protected (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994),
which “fits” perfectly with the agency theory arguments.
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From the duality perspective, keeping the CEO and chairman positions together can
provide the firm with more effective leadership toward formulating and implementing
strategies as well as avoiding potential rivalry and conflicts at the top level (Baliga, Moyer, &
Rao, 1996). In this particular case, since only one person keeps the power within the top
management team and board of directors (Davidson, Worrell, & Nemec, 1998), the duality
perspective will help to “establish a unity of command at the top of the firm, with unambiguous
leadership clarifying decision-making authority and sending reassuring signals to stakeholders”
(Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994: 1081). On the opposite side, if the CEO and chairperson are not
same individuals, this non-duality perspective can have the board better function in monitoring
the top management team via becoming “truly” independent (Harris & Helfat, 1998). In other
words, splitting up these two top-rank positions will remove possible constraints in making
decisions towards better value creation for shareholders as well as major concerns on the
board independence (Baliga et al., 1996).
In the context of EMNCs, if the host country is an emerging economy, it may be better
to have a CEO-duality structure due to the fact that the CEO is already familiar with conditions
of an emerging market from his or her home country and therefore, he or she should be able to
make faster and good-quality decisions by gaining support from other top executives without a
“big” necessity of “detailed” corporate monitoring. On the other side, if the host country is a
developed economy, it is more likely that the CEO may get confused, feel pressured, and even
might not process the information available to him or her correctly due to unfamiliar conditions
of that host country. Thus, a more “strict” monitoring and strategic guidance may be required
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by keeping the CEO and chairperson positions separated. As a result, I argue that the effect of
CEO-(non)duality on the EMNCs’ international performance is certainly context-dependent.
Proposition 2a: The CEO duality will have a positive influence on the international performance
of the EMNC if the host country is an emerging economy.
Proposition 2b: The CEO non-duality will have a positive influence on the international
performance of the EMNC if the host country is a developed economy.

CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION
This early-stage theoretical paper, which is grounded in the agency theory and upper
echelons perspective, looks at how different CEO characteristics (age, international experience,
and duality) affect the EMNCs’ international performance. From the perspective of corporate
governance, it is critical to examine how different governance elements may play some unique
roles in the context of EMNCs since emerging markets are very much different than developed
economies and therefore, “key” success factors for better firm performance may certainly vary.
This research contributes to the management literature in a couple different ways. First,
it provides a brief review on widely-used theories in firm internationalization. Second, it
emphasizes the importance of corporate governance on EMNCs’ performance by particularly
focusing on the CEO. Third, it argues that some relationships between independent and
dependent variables can certainly be context-dependent. And finally, it examines the
interaction effect of international experience on a proposed relationship.
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This paper will certainly need to be improved in later stages. First, the theoretical model
needs to be further developed by including more evidence from the literature. Second, by
collecting the data, current propositions including moderating effects will need to be
empirically tested. Third, instead of only focusing on the CEO, demographics of the top
management team can be examined. And finally, it may be fruitful to look at whether a
particular region or continent that an EMNC belongs to makes a difference in its international
performance.
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